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Voluntarism in occupational health and 
safety: the New Zealand response 
Elizabeth A. Mullen* 
There has been considerable debate as to whether attempting to improve health and 
safety practices at work by legislation is more effective than voluntarism and the 
play of market forces. A survey was conducted in mid 1988 to ascertain the 
response of New Zealand enterprises to a Voluntary Code of Practice (1987) issued by 
the Advisory Council for Occupational Safety and Health. An attempt was also 
made to identify internal and external factors which might have influenced the 
decision to comply. It would appear that a voluntary approach has some part to 
play, but the absence of effective health and safety legislation in New Zealand may 
particularly disadvantage those working in small firms in high risk industries. 
1 . Introduction 
Governments in the western world have attempted a number of approaches to 
encourage or compel managements to improve health and safety standards for their 
workforces. In the early 1970s, the United States, together with many European nations, 
tackled occupational health and safety by way of drastic revision of their legislation. 
Canada, and to some extent Australia, followed suit in the late 1970s. In contrast, New 
Zealand directed its attention, not to legislative attempts to reduce industrial injury and 
disease, but to compensation in the form of the Accident Compensation Act 1972. New 
Zealand has subsequently failed to address the issue of its scattered and often ineffective 
legislation governing health and safety in the workplace (Duignan, 1983, p.lOO; 
Campbell, 1983, p.92; 1986, p.l77; 1987, p.16). Compensation for workers tended to 
be the number one priority with neither prevention nor rehabilitation gtven the attention 
that the originators of the scheme envisaged. 
The question of the reform of industrial health and safety legislation resurfaced in 
1987 with the promulgation of a voluntary Code of practice for health and safety 
representatives and health and safety commiuees. This code was developed out of 
consultation between the Department of Labour, the New Zealand Employers Federation 
(NZEF) and the Federation of Labour (now the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions), 
under the auspices of the Advisory Council for Occupational Safety and Health 
(ACOSH). The ACOSH code of practice was issued in 1987 by the Department of 
Labour to all registered factories in New Zealand, employing more than 10 people. 
Codes of practice have been issued previously to various sectors of industry, but this new 
code represented a novel attempt to standardise practices throughout New Zealand 
enterprises. The ACOSH code provided for the: "election, functions, rights and 
obligations of employee health and safety representatives and the establishment, 
membership, functions and procedures of joint employer/employee health and safety 
committees" (Department of Labour, 1987, p.3). 
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The code identified an active role for employee representatives with regard to the right 
to information, the right to make representations to employers, time off for attendance at 
trade union health and safety training courses, the right to refuse dangerous work, 
accompanying inspectors and receiving their reports to the company and inviting in 
technical advisers from appropriate outside organisations, including trade unions. 
The New Zealand Employers Federation, despite its direct involvement in the 
development of the A COSH Code, simultaneously issued an alternative code of practice 
(NZEF, 1987). This NZEF code modified some key provisions of the ACOSH code, 
particularly some of the elements concerned with the role of representatives, and the 
direct involvement of trade unions. 
A number of influences on health and safety practices, and by implication on the 
adoption of a code of practice, have been reported in recent years. In the United 
Kingdom, it has been found that managements which accord personnel matters a 
relatively high priority in decision making are more disposed toward the introduction of 
safety representative regulations (Beaumont and Leopold, 1982, pp.73-4). Several New 
Zealand studies have identified the importance of the hierarchical level of, and the amount 
of time spent by the person responsible for health and safety, the involvement of trade 
unions and the inclusion of appropriate clauses in negotiated awards and agreements 
(Chew, 1984, p.566; Duignan, 1983, p.l 04; Mcintosh and Gurdon, 1986, p.529; 
Campbell, 1987, p.40). 
Studies in New Zealand and overseas have confirmed that government rules and 
inspection and the provision of training for those with specific responsibility for health 
and safety arc essential ingredients in the reduction of accidents and ill health (Mcintosh 
and Gurdon, 1986, p.531; Parmeggiani, 1982, p.282; Campbell, 1983, p.95). Stress has 
also been placed on the need for clear definition of the rights of workers with regard to 
access to information on workplace hazards and participation in the health and safety 
decision making processes (Kjellstrom, 1983, pp. 1 07-8; Parmeggiani, 1982, p.275; 
Campbell, 1983, p. 94; 1986, p.l78). 
It has been suggested that foreign ownership and control of an organisation may lead 
to improved management of personnel and industrial relations matters and hence 
contribute to the effectiveness of enterprise health and safety programmes (Campbell and 
Rowan, 1983, p.31; Mcintosh and Gurdon, 1986, p.522; Purcell, Marginson and Sisson, 
1987, p.l34 ). Mcintosh and Gurdon concluded from their study that in New Zealand 
multinational (foreign owned) enterprises instituted significantly more effective health 
and safety programmes than domestic enterprises. They saw this a) arising from the 
greater skills demonstrated by multinationals in industrial relations and their willingness 
to accord trade unions a legitimate role in health and safety decisions. For example, 
multinational enterprises in Mcintosh and Gurdon's study were far more likely to have 
negotiated health and safety clauses into awards and agreements. 
The rate of adoption of a voluntary code of practice (ACOSH or NZEF) in New 
Zealand enterprises was included as part of a much broader project looking at the presence 
and scope of health and safety programmes in New Zealand enterprises and how this was 
influenced by enterprise size, a degree of foreign ownership, managerial practices, risk 
levels, inspection, and trade unions. 
2. Method 
Subjects 
A random sample of all economically active organisations in New Zealand was 
selected from the New Zealand Business Directory (1988), held on computer by the 
Department of Statistics. The sample was stratified according to the New Zealand 
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Standard Industrial Classification (NZSIC) to ensure the selection of the full range of 
enterprise types and productive activities with their associated levels of industrial risk. 
As the ACOSH Code of Practice was only sent to firms employing 10 or more 
people, all finns employing less than 10 were excluded. Despite this exclusion there 
was still a danger of swamping the sample with the large number of small organisations 
in New Zealand. The sample was therefore disproportionately selected on the basis of 
10-49 employees 1:100, 50-99 employees 1:50 and 100+ employees I: 10. These ratios 
were varied within several of the NZSICs where the total number of enterprises was too 
low to ensure selection of all size categories. The initial sample size was 415. 
Demographic data, which included the number of business locations, number of 
persons employed, the New Zealand Enterprise IndusLrial Classification (NZEIC), 
business type and degree of foreign ownership was supplied from the Directory for each 
enterpnse. 
Design 
The hypothesis for this study was that the size of the enterprise, degree of foreign 
ownership and scope of enterprise heal th and safety practices would have an effect on the 
adoption rate of a code of practice. The influence of these factors would be moderated by 
the activities of trade unions, the level of indusLry risk and the level of inspection. 
Independent variables 
Enterprise size and degree of foreign ownership was obtained as part of the data base 
from the New Zealand Business Directory. The scope of health and safety practices 
within the enterprise was operationalised under 4 categories: 
(i) Responsibility: this related principally to the role and seniority of the 
person with overall responsibility and the amount of time that person 
spent on health and safety maLLers; 
(ii) Policy and procedures: this covered the existence of company health and 
safety policy, written health and safety rules, the presence of health and 
safety responsibilities in individual job descriptions and the inclusion of 
health and safety procedures in induction programmes; 
(iii) Training: the provision of training for the person with specific 
responsibility for health and safety and for employees at the various levels 
within the organisation; 
(iv) Negotiated clauses in awards and agreements. 
Moderating Variables 
Risk was operationalised by the enterprise ACC levy per $100 of payroll and the 
enterprise rating of the level of risk entailed in its productive activities. Inspection was 
operationalised by the level of inspection during the previous twelve months. 
The trade union variable was operationalised in 3 parts: 
(i) Trade union general influence was concerned with trade union ability to 
negotiate clauses into awards and agreements, to resist pressure for 
enterprise bargaining during the 1987/88 wage round and by confirmation 
by the enterprise that trade unions had been influential in their health and 
safety programmes; 
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(ii) Trade union direct influence on health and safety decisions within the 
enterprise with regard to participatory schemes and the adoption of a code 
of practice; 
(iii) Trade union size was based on the size of the main trade union representing 
the workforce in an enterprise. 
Instrumentation 
A 16 page questionnaire was developed principally on the basis of previous studies 
re{X)rted by Beaumont and Leopold ( 1982) and Mcintosh and Gurdon (1986). 
A small pilot study with a sample of 10 local enterprises selected from the New 
Zealand business who's who (1987) was conducted to test face, content and construct 
validity. Following a 100 percent response, some sections of the questionnaire were 
reformatted, extended or omitted. 
Postal procedure 
The postal survey procedure suggested by Hoinville, Howell and Associates (1979, 
p.60) was used. Questionnaires were mailed to the 415 enterprises in the sample with a 
covering letter and prepaid return envelope. After 3 weeks, 125 completed questionnaires 
had been received. A reminder was sent out in the fourth week and a further 38 responses 
were received. A second reminder elicited 89 responses giving a total of 252 responses. 
Variable weighting 
Responses to ind1v1dual quesuons under relevant questionnaire sections relating to the 
opcrauonal1scd varwblcs were grouped by way of a weighted score derived on the basis of 
an assessment of the relative Importance of the individual factors. This score was 
transformed into a percentage. To facilitate analysis usmg cross-tabulations and chi-
squares, these percentage scores were placed in interval scales. Staustical analysis was 
undertaken using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X). To ehmtnate 
bias due to disproporuonate samplmg, all results were weighted back to reconstruct the 
characteristics of the original population. 
3. Results 
Sample characteristics 
Of the mi tial ~rnple of 415 enterpnscs, 30 (7 .2 percent) were unusable as they could 
not be traced, had ceased to trade or had fallen below 10 employees. This left a usable 
sample of 385. A response rate of 66 percent was obtained which generated a data ba.l.)e 
of 252 val1d responses. 
The sample con~1~tcd of 222 (H8.2 percent) domestic New Zealand enterpnses, 5 (1.8 
percent) had m 1 non ty f oretgn ownersh 1p and 25 ( 10.0 percent) maJOfll y foreign 
owner..;htp. (Populallon 85.0 percent, 2.0 percent and 13 percent respccllvely). 
The sample frequencies in the three si1e groups were, 10-49 people 79.6 percent, 50-
99 people 10.2 percent and 1 00+ people 10.0 percent (population 80.5 percent, 10.2 
percent and 9.5 percent rcspccuvely). The average levy for the enterpnscs tn th{; study 
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was $2.60 per $100 of payroll (the average reported by New Zealand Law Commission 
for 1987188 was $2.65 per $100 of payroll). The average number of persons engaged by 
an enterprise was 64.8 at 3.4 business locations. (Population 71.9 at 1.6 locations). 
Demographic data for the early and late responders was compared to that of non-
responders and unusables. There was no difference between early and late responders. 
Non-responding and unusable enterprises were smaller, employing on average 51 people 
at 2.5 business locations. The average levy for this group per $100 of payroll was 
$1.40. Data for populations was taken from New Zealand business patterns (Department 
of Statistics, 1987). 
Adoption of a voluntary code of practice 
The ACOSH code was received by 40.0 percent of the sample while 32.2 percent 
reported receiving a copy of the NZEF code. Adoption of the ACOSH code was 
considered by 19.4 percent of lhe sample and 16.2 percent considered the NZEF code. 
Adoption of a ccxle was reported by 14.6 percent of the respondents. 
An entire code was adopted by 2.5 percent for the ACOSH code and 2.1 percent for 
the NZEF code. A modified version (which for some en terprises involved some 
combination of the two codes) was selected by 9.7 percent for the ACOSH code and 5.9 
percent for the NZEF code. The frequencies for the key stages of the adoption process are 
set out in Table 1. 
Table 1: Code of practice adoption process (percentage) 
ACOSH Code 
Yes No 
Received a copy 40.0 32.9 
Considered adoption 19.4 12.6 
Adopted entire ccxle 2.5 
Adopted modified version 9.7 
Don't 
Know 
25.4 
9.6 
Trade unions and voluntary codes of practi<'e 
NZEFCode 
Yes No 
Don't 
Know 
31.5 40.5 25.9 
16.2 12.3 8.9 
2.1 
5.9 
The frequencies for direct influence of trade unions on worker participation in health 
and safety within the enterprise and adoption of a code of practice were low. Each 
enterprise was assigned a percentage score. No enterprise scored above 50 percent and 
most (94 percent) scored zero. Despite this finding, a code of pra~tice was adopted by 2.3 
percent of respondents as the result of a request to include a code in a 1987/88 award or 
agreement, and 1.6 percent had adopted a code as the result of a direct request from the 
trade union(s) representing their workforce. 
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The correlations between the rate of adoption of a code of practice and trade union 
general influence, trade union size and trade union influence on worker participation and 
adoption of a code of praclice were all significant (r = .29, p<.OOO 1, r = .22, p<.OOO 1 and 
r = .44, p<.OOOI respectively). When partial correlations were conducted for these 
variables, controlling for size of the enterprise, the correlation for the general influence of 
trade unions weakened but the correlation with the influence on worker participation and 
codes of practice did not change. 
The trade union influence on worker participation and adoption of a code of practice 
variable accounted for 25 percent of the variance in the adoption of a code of practice in 
step 1. of stepwise multiple regression. Enterprise policy and level of responsibility 
accounted for a further 9 percent of the variance (sec Table 2). 
Table 2: Stepwise multiple regression with the adoption of a code of practice as 
dependent variable 
Independent V ariablc 
Step 1: Trade union influence on worker 
participation and codes of practice 
Step 2: Policy 
Step 3: Rcsponsibili ty 
r-squarcd 
.25 
.32 
.34 
Beta 
.382387 
.223065 
.157999 
Correlations on the variables wh ich appeared in stepwise multiple regression (shown 
in Table 2) and trade un ion general influence were all significant. V cry low levels of 
correlation were obtained for these variables with trade union size, but again, these were 
significant (sec Table 3). 
No significant correlation was found between enterprise size and trade union general 
influence. There was a significant but low correlation between enterprise size and trade 
union size (r = .22, p<.OOO 1 ). 
Table 3: Pearson's r for trade union variables and explanatory ~Variables in stepwise 
multiple regression 
Trade union influence on worker 
participation and codes of practice 
Policy 
Responsi bi li ty 
Trade union general influence Trade union size 
.25 p<.OOOI 
.30 p<.OOO 1 
.22 p<.OOO 1 
.15 p<.008 
.17 p<.004 
.16 p<.006 
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Scope of health and safety practices 
The correlation between the adoption rate of a code of practice ·and health and safety 
policy and procedures within the enterprise was r = .44, p<.OOO l. The correlation with 
responsibility, which related to the hierarchical level of the person(s) responsible and 
time spent on health and safety matters was r = .38, p<.0001. To ensure that enterprise 
size was not confounding these results, partial correlation controlling for size was 
conducted . Correlations between policy and responsibility and the code of practice 
variable fell tor= .41, p<.0001 and r = .30, p<.0001 respectively. 
Specific training for the person(s) responsible for health and safety and for employees 
through the hierarchical levels correlated at r = .37, p<.OOO 1 with the rate of adoption. 
Health and safety clauses had been negotiated into all awards and agrccn1ents applicable to 
the workforce for 48.0 percent of the respondents and 12.1 percent reported that some 
awards or agreements contained such clauses. The correlations for the variables policy 
and procedures, and training with clauses in awards and agreements were significant but 
low (r = .23, p<.OOOI and r = .25, p<.0001 respectively). Correlations with clauses in 
awards and agreements with responsibility, and with trade union direct influence in 
enterprise worker participation and codes of practice were not significant. 
Enterprise size and degree of foreign ownership 
The correlation between enterprise size and the adoption of a code of practice was 
significant (r = .30, p<.OOOl J. However, the expected relationshtp between a degree of 
foreign ownership and the rate of adoption of a code of practice could not be 
demonstrated. Size of the enterprise and degree of foreign ownership did not explain any 
of the variance in the code of pracuce variable in stepwise multiple regression. 
Of the the variables which influenced the adoption rate of a code of practice in 
stepwise multiple regression, the level of responsibility taken for health and safety in the 
enterprise had the highest correlation at r = .38, p<.0001 (sec Table 4). 
Table 4: Correlation of variables in stepwise multiple regression with size of the 
enterprise 
Variables in-stepwise 
multiple regression 
Trade union influence on worker 
participation and a code of practice 
Policy 
Responsibility 
Pearson's r 
with enterprise size 
r = . 21 (p<. 000 1 ) 
r = . 1 9 (p<. 00 1 ) 
r = .38 (p<.OOO 1) 
\ 
Again, the expected relationship belween degree of foreign ownership and 
organisational practices did not emerge. The correlation between the degree of foreign 
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ownership and policy was was very low at r = .14, p<.Ol. No correlation was found 
between degree of foreign ownership and the other two variables shown in Table 4. 
The influence of risk 
The only risk variable which correlated significantly with the adoption of a code of 
practice was inspection (r = .22, p<.OOO 1 ). The enterprise rating of perceived risk and 
inspection variables had correlations of r = .25, p<.OOOI and r = .21, p<.OOO 1 
respectively with policy. These results indicate that there was only a small relationship 
between the identification of risk and action to alleviate such risk. There was no direct 
evidence that the size of the enterprise or a degree of foreign ownership led to a greater 
propensity to identify and act on risk. The size of the enterprise did correlate 
significantly with the responsibility and and policy variables, but the indications were 
that this was not related to possible risk involved in productive activities. 
Impact of a code on participatory schemes 
Some enterprises had set up participatory schemes independently of, and prior to the 
issuing of the codes of practice. Overall, employee health and safety representatives were 
reported by 15.6 percent of the respondents and 15.8 percent reported health and safety 
committees (sec Table 5). 
Table 5: Frequencies for employee health and safety representatives and committees by 
size of enterprise 
Representatives 
Committees 
Percentage of 
sample 
15.6 
15.8 
Number of employees (percentage) 
10-49 50-99 100+ 
10.0 31.5 44.0 
9.1 29.0 55.4 
These results were modified when the distribution of participatory schemes across all 
business locations was examined. Representatives at all locations were reported by 14.1 
percent (90 percent of those who had representallves) while only 6.2 percent of those 
who had committees (39 percent) had them at all locations. Both committees and 
representatives were reponed by 5.5 percent of the sample and 4.2 percent had an 
unspecified type of parllctpatory scheme at aJllocaLJons (see Table 6). 
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Table 6: Frequencies for worker participation at business locations (percentage) 
All Some 
Represcn ta ti vcs 14.1 5.8 
Committees 6.2 5.8 
Both 5.5 3.4 
Other 4.2 3.7 
3. Discussion 
Even by the most generous calculations, of those enterprises which claimed to have 
received a code of practice, less than 31 percent were prepared to adopt on a purely 
voluntary basis. Even this figure gives a false picture as, of those who adopted, only a 
very small proportion were prepared to institute all the provisions of one or other of the 
codes. Most enterprises adopted in a form which departed significantly from the central 
provisions of the ACOSH code in particular. This confirms the conclusions drawn by 
the Department of Labour from their survey (Moir, 1989) p.21) that the impact of 
voluntary codes on health and safety management was disappointingly slight. 
Several key issues arise out of this study which could have major implications for 
the introduction of effective health and safety regulations. The first is that a factor in the 
effective management of occupational health and safety, and willingness to comply with 
regulatory requirements was the enterprise size, the hierarchical level of the people 
responsible for enterprise health and safety and the amount of time spent on health and 
safety. There was a definite, if not strong, increased propensity to adopt a voluntary code 
of practice in larger organisations which recognised the necessity for setting up 
managerial structures and developing spcci fie procedures for dealing with risk. This 
confirms the findings in previous studies, that larger enterprises arc more likely to 
comply with legislative requirements and to have someone with specific responsibilities 
for health and safety at a higher level than smaller enterprises (Beaumont and Leopold, 
1982; Mcintosh and Gurdon, 1986; Walters, 1987). 
Foreign ownership did not emerge as influencing either enterprise health and safety 
practices or the adoption of a code of practice. This is contrary to previous findings. 
One large enterprise in this study, which could be readily identified as belonging to an 
international group, was not classified by the New Zealand business directory (1988) as 
being foreign owned (being listed as a private limited liability company, business type 
2), and was not shown as a subsidiary of a multinational or foreign owned company in 
the New Zealand business who's who ( 1987). There may have been other enterprises in 
the sample with similar characteristics which were less easy to identify. This, coupled 
with the fact that the randomly drawn sample contained 20 percent fewer enterprises with 
some foreign ownership than the population may account in part for the failure to 
separate increased performance due to multinational conncct.ions from increased 
performance due to size. 
The issue of size raises one of the most difficult problems involved in the move 
towards improving health and safety in every enterprise for all workers, namely how to 
target the small finn. In New Zealand, 28 percent of the workforce is employed in firms 
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employing less than 10 pwple. For example, the average number of employees in fmn s 
in the Building and Construction Industry is 5.5. Other industries characterised by high 
levels of risk and small firms include Agriculture, Hunting and Fishing, Mining and 
Quarrying, and Transport. 
The clifficulties of improving heal th and safety practices in these industries could well 
be exacerbated as changes in employment and operating practices fragment the workforce 
and loosen traditional affiliations with worker organisations. It is worthwhile at this 
point to look at a couple of examples from overseas to illustrate the effect that these 
factors can have on the effectiveness of health and safety legislation. 
In the construction industry in the United Kingdom the practice of sub-contracting 
(sometirnes up to 200 small firms on one site) has, according to some authors, led to a 
loss of control over safety standards by the main contractors and a dramatic increase in 
the percentage of fatalities and major injuries (Beaumont and Leopold, 1982, p.69; The 
Economist, 14 November, 1987). Small firms by-pass or ignore statutory requirements 
in order to remain competitive. Workers remain si lent in order to remain in 
employment. Trade unions arc unwilling or unable to intervene, and, in site bargaining, 
frcquenlly condone the accepLance of unsafe conditions (Codrington and Henley, 1981, 
p.308). 
Walters (1987 p.48), in his study of trade union workplace organisation with regard 
to health and safety in the printing industry in the UK, suggests that the power and 
presence of trade unions in the workplace has been eroded as the resul t of a political 
philosophy and policy aimed at 'improving' industrial relations. This has minimised the 
impact of health and safety legislation where trade union workplace power was intended 
to support and strengthen its effectiveness. 
This discussion with regard to the issue of enterprise size and trade unions leads us to 
the second key factor in this study, the role of trade unions in the adoption and 
Implementation of codes of practice. There was little evidence that trade unions were 
inOuential tn the selection of representatives or the establishment of health and safety 
committees for participatory heallh and safety schemes within the enterprise. They were, 
however, able to influence the decision to adopt a code of practice in 27 percent of the 
enterprises which did so. This may have been partly due to the efforts made by the trade 
unions lO encourage the adoption of codes of practice via the health and safety centres set 
up in the five mam centres with ACC funding. The trade unions have also played an 
essential role tn ensunng that a maJor proporuon of even the smallest firms were at least 
covered by health and safety clauses, however minimal, in awards and agreements. 
The incidence of clauses in negotiated awards and agreements was higher in this study 
than previously reported in New Zealand (Mcintosh and Gurdon, 1986, p.529). Over 60 
percent of the respondents reported that all or part of their workforce were covered by 
such clauses. In a recent study to identify managerial bargaining scope in New Zealand, 
tt was found that over 65 percent of employers would be willing to negotiate over health 
and safety issues at national or enterprise level (McAndrew, 1989, p.l45). This could 
well be related to a wish on the part of employers to pre-empt or avoid the introduction 
of legislation, but could also reflect past experience that bargaining over such issues has 
never threatened managerial prerogatives and required little in the way of action. 
Certainly in this study little relationship could be found between the presence of 
negotiated health and safety clau';eS m awards and agreements and an Improvement tn 
health and safety pracuces. 
Previous work tn this area has led to the suggestion that larger, and therefore 
potentially more powerful trade untons could be more successful in influencing enterprise 
health and safety practices (Beaumont and Leopold, 1982, p.72). In this study the general 
inn uence of trade unions was not modified by trade union size or restricted to larger 
enterprises. There was some evidence that larger enterprises were more likely to be 
covered by a larger trade union although the anticipated relallonship between trade union 
sue, enterpn~e \lie and the general tnfluence of trade unions did not emerge. Trade 
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unions were, for example, able to negotiate clauses into awards and agreements covering 
enterprises across all size ranges. There is a good case for suggesting that the lack of a 
clear relationship between trade union strength and plant size in this study could be due 
to the New Zealand system of nationally negotiated awards and blanket coverage of all 
fmns in the same industry. 
The move towards regional, enterprise and even plant level bargaining in New 
Zealand, now strengthened by the amendment to the Labour Relations Act 1987 allowing 
employers to cite themselves out of national awards after balloting their workers, will 
obviously lead to a diminution in blanket coverage. This, coupled with continuing 
economic problems and high levels of unemployment will lead to a reduction of trade 
union influence, particularly in smaller enterprises. Firms employing less than 50 
people cannot cite themselves out of awards, but the general trend is bound to lead to a 
reduction in the ability of trade unions to influence organisational obligations with regard 
to occupational health and safety, whether contractual or statutory, in smaller firm s. 
The third, and probably the most controversial area, is inspection. The level of 
inspection experienced by an enterprise in the 12 months prior to the survey appeared to 
have a small degree of influence on the adoption of a code of practice. No other 
relationship between risk and inspection and the scope of health and safety practices was 
found. 
The only raison d'etre for an inspectorate is that it targets "at risk" firms and is 
willing and able to take effective action to ensure the introduction and maintenance of 
statutory safety standards in all enterprises, since "such standards are obviously not worth 
much if they are not enforced" (Kjellstrom, 1983, p.lll). The experience in the United 
States, for example, is that workers' representatives have complained that enforcement 
agencies tend to be more attentive to employers' economic considerations than the health 
and safety of workers. In the United Kingdom, sanctions have not been applied to cases 
of failure to observe regulations due to the reluctance of agencies to press charges 
(Campbell, 1986, pp.178 and 183). 
Despite the average ACC levy for the sample being close to the population average, 
and the fact that these arc based on the individual assessment of risk for enterprise 
productive activities, there was no indication that the level of risk associated with ACC 
levies alerted enterprises to the potential risk entailed in their operations. This could be 
more than partly due to the general feeling that levies are unfairly high and therefore do 
not reflect actual risk. In the United Kingdom Leopold and Beaumont (1983, p.136) 
found that identification of risk was associated with a greater propensity to comply with 
statutory requirements to set up participatory structures. No such association was found 
in this study. 
There have obviously been difficulties in the past in coordinating the work of the 
various agencies responsible for the maintenance of health and safety standards in New 
Zealand. This could be facilitated by bringing the institutions which deal with 
occupational health and safety together under one umbrella with a universally applied set 
of standards and access to all available data. Identification of 'at risk' firms should not 
present a problem, as the ACC has records of the worst p~rformers. The inspectorate, as 
a matter of urgency, should have access to these records as a first step towards improving 
their performance. It will certainly take time to establish structures and procedures which 
will ensure long term security, but regular and accurate inspection, coupled with the 
ability to take appropriate action can modify the worst practices (The Economist, 14 
November, 1987). 
The final area for consideration is worker participation in workplace health and safety 
decision making. The results of this study and the survey undertaken by the Department 
of Labour suggest that there was only a limited willingn~ss to comply with the 
participatory structures which formed the basis of the ACOSH code. To some degree 
this appears to be a function of size. Of the enterprises in this study employing more 
than 50 people, 42 percent had health and safety committees and 38 percent had health 
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and safety worker representatives. The Department of Labour selected its survey sample 
on a different basis from this study (with no category for firms employing less than 50 
people). This complicated comparison between the 2 surveys. 
However, they reported that 43 percent of their sample had health and safety 
committees and 32 percent had worker representatives (very similar study for enterprises 
employing more than 50 people). It was the enterprises in the group employing between 
10 and 49 people where little progress had been made. Only 9 percent had committees 
and 10 percent had worker representatives. While the figures presented above do not 
appear to be too damning, particularly for larger enterprises, the Department of Labour 
survey also found that only 30 percent of the firm s in their study had equal 
managcmenUsupervisor/cmploycc representation. The vast majority had no employee 
representati ves at all. Overall, the findings of both surveys would appear to confirm the 
contention Lhat New Zealand employers arc unenthusiastic about worker participation, 
particularly when there is a clear role for trade unions and an equal say for workers 
(Campbell , 1987, p.IOI; Committee of Enquiry into Industrial Democracy, 1989, p.7; 
New Zealand Business Round Table, 1989, p .l9). 
4. Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that Lhe attempt to tackle occupational health and safety by 
voluntary means has on ly had very limited success in New Zealand. The actual rate of 
adoption of a code of practice was cause for concern, but even more worrying was the fac t 
that adoption was only minimally associated with industry risk. Compliance, whether 
voluntary or in response to legislation, is meaningless where it cannot be shown to have 
a direct impact on the reduc ti on of accidcnLc; and ill health in high risk industries. 
In June 1988 ACOS H issued a public discussion paper, entitled Occupational safety 
and health reform, wh1ch put forward a one act, one authority framework for legislation. 
The basic pnnciples included a role for the Government, employers, and workers and 
their representatives. What is difficult to understand i s why the Discussion Paper was so 
hastil y issued, prior to the completion of the Department of Labour's survey on the 
response to the voluntary code of practice, and was not followed up with the introduction 
of a Bill until Julv 1990. 
~ 
Experience elsewhere suggests that legislation cannot replace health and safety 
programmes, but it can encourage their development (S ingleton, 1983, p.l67). There 1s 
also general agreement that legislation should make prov isions for truly participatory 
struc tures within the enterprise, a legitimate ro le for trade unions and an effective 
inspectorate wi th a mandate to take whatever action is necessary, up to and including 
plant closure (Parmeggiani, 1982, p.275; Kjcllstrom, 1983, p . l07; Campbell , 1987, 
pp.41 -2; The Econonzis1 , 14 November, 1987). 
It rcma1ns to be seen whether the new legislation will be passed and if so, whether it 
will ensure the proviSIOn of acceptable minimum safety standards for all workers. The 
indicauons arc that th1s legislation will not carry a mandatory requirement for enterprises 
to set up participatory structures, nor will there be a clearly defined role for trade unions. 
The failure to include these clements can only be seen as a retrograde step , below what 
workers and Lhcir rcprcsentaLJvcs could have expected based on the provisions o f the 
ACOSH code of practice. The proposals arc, however, very much in line with the view 
of New Zealand employers that compulsion is not conduci ve to cooperati on and could be 
countcr-producuvc in Lhc development of relationships between employer and employee 
to facil itate Improved performance in occupational health and safety via, for example, 
education and train ing programmes. It is unlikely that employers who were recalc itrant 
in comply ing with a voluntary code of practice w ill suddenly undertake cooperati ve 
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arrangements with their workers and provide education, training and other programmes 
which will increase their health and safety performance. 
In addition to the failure to introduce some mandatory clement for participatory 
structures, the less detailed, performance standard, general duty nature of the proposed 
legislation (partly to facilitate flexibility in dealing with technological and other change) 
moves away from the specific standards and regulations which formerly applied. This 
has the potential for lightening the load of recalcitrant employers even further. The 
problems that this sort of legislation can create is documented by Parmeggiani (1982, 
p.273) who suggests that: 
The type of legislation is imporlant from an enforcement point of view, the 
less detailed the greater the technical skill required from lhe inspectorate. 
Legislation which just states objectives puts a burden on medium and small 
enterprises ... 
Legislation docs seem to be the next logical step. The expectation was that this 
would be formulated on the basis of the Code of practice for health and safety 
representatives and health and safety committees (1987), or at least on the less radical 
public discussion paper Occupational safety and health reform (1988). It remains to be 
seen whether the Government's actual legislative response, which makes fewer demands 
on employers, has potential for greater demands on the inspectorate and gives no 
statutory right for workers and their representatives to be involved, is sufficient for real 
progress to be made in improving New Zealand's occupational health and safety record. 
The chances are that real improvement may be just as, or even more, remote than it was 
~fore. 
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